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et al.: Contracts

CONTRACTS
I.

MEASURE OF ACTUAL DAMAGES FOR CROP FAILURE IN ACTION
FOR BREACH OF HERBICIDE WARRANTY

In Hill v. BASF Wyandotte Corp.1 the South Carolina Supreme Court defined the measure of actual damages for the
breach of a herbicide warranty2 as the value the crop would have
had if the product had conformed to the warranty less the value
of the crop actually produced and the expense of preparing for
market the portion of the crop prevented from maturing.3 Although the court had previously used this measure of damages
in crop failure cases, this measure was never said to reflect actual damages. 4 Thus, the case blurred previous distinctions between actual and consequential damages 5 and rendered useless
otherwise valid contractual limitations of damages.6
As acknowledged by the supreme court,7 the measure of
1. 280 S.C. 174, 311 S.E.2d 734 (1984).
2. Plaintiff Hill, a farmer, purchased and used the herbicide Basalin on 1,450 acres
of soybeans. Basalin is manufactured by defendant BASF Wyandotte Corporation
(BWC). Hill used another herbicide, Treflan, on 200 acres and alleged that the Treflan
treated crops were better in yield and quality than the Basalin treated crops. Hill sued
BWC in United States District Court for breach of oral and written warranties and was
awarded $207,725.00. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that only the written warranties on the labels of the product applied and that the
limitation of warranties on each can of Basalin was valid. The limitation stated that "[i]n
no case shall 'BWC' or the Seller be liable for consequential, special or indirect damages
resulting from the use or handling of this product." Id. at 176, 311 S.E.2d at 735. The
Fourth Circuit specifically left open the question of how to measure the actual damages
in the case. Hill v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 696 F.2d 287, 292 n.6 (4th Cir. 1982). On
remand the district court certified the question to the South Carolina Supreme Court
pursuant to S.C. Sup. CT. R. 46 (Supp. 1984).
3. Id. at 179, 311 S.E.2d at 736.
4. See, e.g., Simmons v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 279 S.C. 26, 302 S.E.2d 17 (1983); W.R.
Grace and Co. v. LaMunion, 245 S.C. 1, 138 S.E.2d 337 (1964); Amerson v. F.C.X. Co-Op
Service, 227 S.C. 520, 88 S.E.2d 605 (1955); McCown-Clarke Co. v. Muldrow, 116 S.C. 54,
106 S.E. 771 (1921).
5. See D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 12.1 (1973) (referring to crop loss as a special or consequential damage); see also John P. Hollingsworth on Wheels, Inc. v. Arkon Corp., 279
S.C. 183, 305 S.E.2d 71 (1983)(lost profits are well recognized as consequential damages).
6. In Hill the defendant had a valid contractual limitation of damages incorporated
into its product label. See supra note 2.
7. 280 S.C. at 176, 311 S.E.2d at 735.
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damages for a breach of warranty is ordinarily controlled by section 36-2-714(2) of the South Carolina Code,8 which provides
that "[t]he measure of damages for breach of warranty is the
difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value
of the goods accepted and the value they would have had if they
had been as warranted, unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount."' The court noted, however, that the above formula is most appropriate where the nonconforming goods can be repaired or replaced and value can be
defined with certainty. 10
The court found that defective herbicides are different from
the usual nonconforming goods.- "The value of a herbicide as
warranted is difficult to define. Price and value are not
equivalents. From the farmer's perspective, the value of the herbicide is a healthy crop at maturity. In the manufacturer's viewpoint, the value is its selling price.""" The court concluded that
this inability to determine the value of goods as warranted and
accepted created a "special circumstance" within the meaning of
section 36-2-714(2), thus justifying "proximate damages of a different amount."" 2
One author has suggested that the "special circumstances"
exception to the general measure of actual warranty damages is
appropriate when "the buyer at the time of entering into the
contract communicated to the seller sufficient facts to make it
apparent that the damages subsequently claimed were within
the reasonable contemplation of the parties."' 3 Such circumstances also suggest "a proper case"'1 for recovery of consequential damages in addition to the standard measure of actual
damages.1 5 The defendant in Hill undoubtedly knew that all
buyers of its herbicide, Basalin, would apply it to their crops,
and if the Basalin was ineffective, the crops would suffer. The
defendant, however, imposed a valid contractual limitation of

8. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-714(2)(1976).
9. Id.
10. 280 S.C. at 177, 311 S.E.2d at 735-36.
11. Id., 311 S.E.2d at 736.
12. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-714(2)(1976).
13. R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-714:22 (3rd ed. 1983).
14. See S.C. CODE ANN.
16. See S.C. CODE ANN.

§
§

36-2-714(3)(1976).
36-2-715(2)(a)(1976).
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consequential damages on the buyers of Basalin. e
Section 36-2-714(1) of the South Carolina Code 7 allows a
buyer of nonconforming goods to recover as damages "the loss
resulting in the ordinary course of events from the seller's
18
breach as determined in any manner which is reasonable."
Thus, the court in Hill felt free to apply its traditional measure
of damages in crop failure cases. 9 By labeling this measure of
damages "actual, 2 0 the court rendered the herbicide manufacturer's valid contractual limitation of damages useless.
The supreme court could have arrived at the same measure
of damages under section 36-2-714(2), without resorting to the
"special circumstances" exception, if it had been able to find
that the value of the goods accepted was a season of poor weed
control and the value of the goods as warranted was a season of
proper weed control.2 Regardless of the statutory basis on
which it relied, the court's fair result is troubling because it fails
to fully recognize the statutory distinction between actual and
consequential damages. Lost profits, included in the Hill court's
definition of actual damages, are generally considered consequential damages.2 2 The supreme court dismissed this general
characterization of lost profits as "merely coincidental" by clas23
sifying the crop failure as a direct loss.
In Hill the court expressly gives notice that the measure of
actual damages "in cases similar to this" will be the lost crop

16. See supra note 6.
17. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-714(1)(1976).
18. Id. (emphasis added).
19. In Kleven v. Geigy Agricultural Chemicals, 227 N.W.2d 566 (Minn. 1975), a case
factually similar to Hill, the court held that damages for lost crop value were consequential damages for which the manufacturer was not liable under its valid limitation of
remedies clause. A prior Minnesota case, however, had expressly held that the recovery
for lost crops is consequential damages. Frohreich v. Gammon, 28 Minn. 476, 11 N.W. 88
(1881). In contrast, the South Carolina Supreme Court has consistently awarded damages under the formula adopted in Hill without explicitly labeling the damages as direct
or consequential. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. Thus, in Hill the court was
free to declare that lost crop value due to herbicide failure is direct, actual damages.
20. 280 S.C. at 177, 311 S.E.2d at 736.
21. J. WHITE & S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 10-2 n.5 (2d ed. 1980)
(pointing out that the value differential formula in U.C.C. § 2-714(2) is the same as the
precode formula).
22. See supra note 5.
23. 280 S.C. at 178, 311 S.E.2d at 736.
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value formulated above. 24 Thus, South Carolina practitioners
seeking to circumvent contractual limitations on warranty remedies should draw analogies to Hill and plead "special circumstances." South Carolina sellers and manufacturers, on the other
hand, should revise their contractual language and warranty labels to expressly limit the remedies for breach to replacement of
the product itself or refund of the sales price.
Elizabeth W. Settle
II.

RESTATEMENT RULE OF MATERIAL CONTRIBUTION TO
NONOCCURENCE OF CONDITION PRECEDENT ADOPTED

In Champion v. Whaley 25 the South Carolina Court of Appeals adopted the Restatement rule under which a plaintiff is
required only to present evidence that the defendant materially
contributed to the nonoccurence of a condition precedent.26 The
court abrogated the older test requiring a plaintiff to show that
the condition would have occurred "but for" the defendant's
27

lack of cooperation.

In August 1979 Whaley and Edwards, the sellers, signed an
exclusive agreement 28 with Champion, a realtor, to sell a house.
Under the agreement, Champion would list the house for 120
days and would receive a six percent sales commission "if [the]
property [were] sold, conveyed or otherwise transferred within
90 days after the termination of this authority . . . to anyone
with whom agent has had negotiations.
-"9Champion found

24. Id. at 177, 311 S.E.2d at 736.
25. 280 S.C. 116, 311 S.E.2d 404 (Ct. App. 1984).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 245 (1981).
27. 280 S.C. at 122, 311 S.E.2d at 407.
28. Both plaintiff and defendants classified the listing as an "exclusive right to sell
agreement." Brief of Appellant at 2, Brief of Respondent at 2. The court of appeals
referred to the listing as an exclusive agency contract, 280 S.C. 118, 311 S.E.2d at 405,
but apparently meant an "exclusive right to sell." An exclusive agency agreement prohibits the owner from selling the property through another broker's agency, but he may still
sell the property through his own efforts. An exclusive right to sell agreement (exclusive
sales contract) prohibits the owner from selling the property either through another broker or personally. Any breach by the seller results in the broker's right to sue for the
commission. Carlsen v. Zane, 261 Cal. App. 2d 399, 401-02, 67 Cal. Rptr. 747, 749 (1968).
29. 280 S.C. at 119, 311 S.E.2d at 406. This contract provision established a condition precedent that the property be "sold" before the obligation to pay the commission
arose. Id.
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a buyer, Joyce Bell, who signed a contract with the sellers in
December 1979. Performance under the contract of sale was conditioned on Bell's obtaining a 100% loan from Farmers Home
Administration (FmHA).On the same day Champion and the
sellers executed an agreement extending the period of exclusive
agency to April 27, 1980. On March 12, 1981, however, Champion learned that Whaley had sold the house to another buyer,
Cauthen,30 and insisted that the contract with Bell be honored.
Several days later a broker of the local Century 21 office and a
FmHA administrator visited the home to appraise it, but were
unable to do so because Cauthen had changed the locks. Since
the property had not been appraised, FmHA could not finalize
the loan to Bell, and the sale was not consummated. 31
The trial judge granted a nonsuit, holding that the evidence
did not establish that the negotiations between Bell and the sellers had been completed.3 2 The court of appeals, however, reversed the trial court and remanded for a new trial. The court
found that Champion's testimony presented sufficient evidence
that Whaley had "substantially contributed" to the prevention
of the contract condition to justify submission of the issue to the
33
jury.

30. 280 S.C. at 118, 311 S.E.2d at 405. Up until two weeks before the trial, title to
the property was vested in the sellers. Cauthen was paying the mortgage, however, and
had made substantial improvements (valued at $2,000.00) on the home. Cauthen testified
that he had recently acquired the property in a handshake deal without the deed passing. Record at 69-73.
31. Id. at 118-19, 311 S.E.2d at 405. Testimony was established at the trial court
that on March 12 Champion had given Whaley a letter from FmHA to Ms. Joyce Bell
which stated that it might be nine months before the funds from FmHA were available.
Record at 37. The sellers relied on this letter to maintain that the sale to Bell would not
have closed on April 6 as required in the contract.
32. Id. at 119, 311 S.E.2d at 40. Relying on Thomas-McCain, Inc. v. Siter, 268 S.C.
193, 232 S.E.2d 728 (1977), the trial judge required that Champion prove the existence of
a valid and enforceable contract between Whaley and himself before any action for the
recovery of a commission could be brought. Record at 92. Finding little evidence to prove
Bell could have closed her loan within the contract period, the trial judge held that negotiations between the buyer and seller were never complete and, therefore, granted a nonsuit. Record at 95.
33. 280 S.C. at 122, 311 S.E.2d at 407. The court noted that under South Carolina
law "a broker has earned his commission when he procures a purchaser who is accepted
by the owner of the property and with whom the latter enters into a valid and enforceable contract. Id. at 119, 311 S.E.2d at 406 (citing Dantzler Real Estate, Inc. v. Boland,
276 S.C. 275, 277 S.E.2d 705 (1981); Thomas-McCain, Inc. v. Siter, 268 S.C. 193, 232
S.E.2d 728 (1977)). This right to a commission may be contingent upon the occurrence of
conditions such as consummation of the sale or delivery of a title free of encumbrances
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A plaintiff suing on a conditional contract must prove that
all conditions precedent to his right of performance have occurred.3 4 A defendant cannot, however, prevent a condition of a
contract and then rely on the plaintiff's resulting nonperformance in an action on the contract. 35 Since Champion presented
evidence that Bell was ready, able, and willing to consummate
the sale, the jury could have inferred that Bell's obligation to
purchase was unconditional 6 and that this satisfied the condition in the exclusive sales listing so that Whaley's obligation to
pay Champion's commission was unconditional. There was also
evidence that the sellers had sold the property to Cauthen, in
repudiation of their contract with Bell. As the court of appeals
observed, "Where a party's repudiation contributes materially to
the nonoccurrence of a condition precedent to his duty of performance, the nonoccurrence of the condition is excused.13 7 Evi-

or liens. If any condition established by the parties "is made a condition precedent to the
owner's obligation to pay the commission, the broker assumes the risk of the purchaser's
nonperformance." 280 S.C. at 119, 311 S.E.2d at 406. In the instant case, the risk of the
purchaser's nonperformance was on Champion until the time when the sellers had an
unconditional right under a valid contract of sale to demand performance from a purchaser procured by Champion. 280 S.C. at 119, 311 S.E.2d at 406. See Dantzler, 276,S.C.
at 275, 277 S.E.2d 705 (1981).
34. 280 S.C. at 120, 311 S.E.2d at 406. Section 15-13-730 of the South Carolina Code
states:
In pleading the performance of conditions precedent in a contract it shall
not be necessary to state the facts showing such performance, hut it may be
stated generally that the party duly performed all the conditions on his part. If
such allegations be contended the party pleading shall be bound to establish at
the trial the facts showing such performance.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-13-730 (1976). See Griffith v. Newell, 69 S.C. 300, 48 S.E. 259
(1904)(plaintiff was not able to recover on a contract because he did not allege performance of all conditions precedent on his part). Thus, any broker suing for his commission
must prove that all conditions precedent to the seller's duty to pay have been fulfilled.
35. 280 S.C. at 120, 311 S.E.2d at 406. See Farrow v. Martin, 16 S.C.L. (Harp.) 409
(1824)(buyer not able to recover for breach of contract in the sale of land because he did
not meet at the predescribed location pursuant to the contract in order to purchase and
transfer title).
36. 280 S.C. at 120, 311 S.E.2d at 406. The court noted that Century 21 had performed a credit check on Bell and determined she was qualified for the loan. FmHA
allocates money on a quarterly basis and a loan can normally be closed out within 120
days. A representative of Century 21 testified that no reason existed why the loan would
not have closed before the contract expiration.
37. Id. at 121, 311 S.E.2d at 407. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 255 comment a (1981) states: "No one should be required to do a useless act, and if because of a
party's repudiation, it appears that the occurrence of a condition of duty would not be
followed by performance of the duty, the nonoccurrence of the condition is generally
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dence of Whaley's sale or rental to Cauthen supported the claim
that the seller's conduct kept the property from being sold to
Bell and thus caused the failure of the condition in the exclusive
listing agreement with Champion.8
The court of appeals rejected the sellers' contentions that
the sale would not have closed by the required date in the contract 39 and that Champion had failed to prove Cauthen's conduct prevented Bell from obtaining the FmHA loan." Although
Champion did have to prove the condition could have occurred
if the sellers had not prevented it,41 he did not have to show that
the loan would have closed "but for" the prevention of the condition.42 Following Shear v. National Rifle Association of
America,4 3 the court adopted the rule in comment b to section

excused." If the nonoccurrence were excused, then the sellers would be obligated to pay
Champion's commission. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 445 comment e
(1958)("a principal is subject to liability if the broker procures a customer having sufficient assets, ready and willing to enter into an enforceable contract with the principal on
the principal's terms . .
").
38. 280 S.C. at 120, 311 S.E.2d at 406-07. Cauthen's presence on the premises, combined with his statements to the FmHA administrator, may have hindered Bell's attempts to obtain FmHA financing.
39. See supra notes 32 & 37.
40. 280 S.C. at 120, 311 S.E.2d at 407.
41. Id. at 121, 311 S.E.2d at 407. See Record Realty, Inc. v. Hull, 15 Wash. App.
826, 552 P.2d 191 (1976)(defendant seller was estopped from asserting nonoccurrence of
conditions precedent, but plaintiff broker had burden of proving he had fulfilled all conditions precedent).
42. 280 S.C. at 122, 311 S.E.2d at 407. The "but for" test was included in the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 295 (1932). For a discussion of this test, see 3A A. CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 269 n.2 (1960).
43. 606 F.2d 1251 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The United States Court of Appeals in Shear

probably only had the use of the

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 269 (Tentative

Draft 1973), which uses the phrase "substantially contribute." The final draft replaced
"substantially contribute" with "contributed materially." Comment b now reads:
Although it is implicit in the rule that the condition has not occurred, it is not
necessary to show that it would have occurred but for the lack of cooperation.
It is only required that the breach have contributed materially to the nonoccurrence. Nevertheless, if it can be shown that the condition would not have
occurred regardless of the lack of cooperation, the failure of performance did
not contribute materially to its nonoccurrence and the rule does not apply.
The burden of showing this is properly thrown on the party in breach.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 245 comment b (1981). The Restatement drafters gave no reason for the change, but the new wording seems to make little, if any,
difference. Courts have viewed the terms "substantial" and "material" as virtually synonymous. See, e.g., Lewandoski v. Finkel, 129 Conn. 526, 29 A.2d 762 (1942); Earle v.
Porter, 112 Ind. App. 71, 40 N.E.2d 381 (1942); Grand Rapids Hydraulic Co. v. American
Fire Ins. Co., 93 Mich. 396, 53 N.W. 538 (1892); State v. Bowers, 226 N.C. 601, 39 S.E.2d

Published by Scholar Commons, 1985

7

LAW REVIEW
CAROLINA
SOUTH
South Carolina
Law Review,
Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [1985], Art.[Vol.
7

37

245 of the Second Restatement of Contracts. This comment
states: "Although it is implicit in the rule that the condition has
not occurred, it is not necessary to show that it would have occurred but for the lack of cooperation. It is only required that
44
the breach have contributed materially to the nonoccurrence."
Under the older "but for" test, a defendant could often, as
here, assert that a complaint of prevention of a condition was
speculative and the condition might not have been performed
even if the defendant had not hindered its performance. The
Second Restatement recognized this problem and rectified it.
The court of appeals properly adopted this new rule.
Richard K. Warther
III. DOCTRINE OF MERGER EXTENDED TO MORTGAGES
In Wilson v. Landstrom45 the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of merger applies not only to deeds
containing terms different from those of a prior contract to sell,
but also to mortgages containing terms different from those in
the contract. 46 This decision is an important consideration in
contract negotiations.
The appellant, Mary Ann Landstrom, living in California,
executed a power of attorney authorizing Harry S. Dent, an attorney, to sell her house in Columbia. Dent subsequently signed
a contract to sell to Chester Street Associates, the respondent.
The contract contained a handwritten addition, which read:
"Seller agrees to accept second mortgage. . . .,4 On the closing
date, Dent delivered the deed, and Chester Street Associates delivered a second mortgage, which contained the following provision: "This is a second mortgage and shall be subject and
subordinate to any first mortgage that Mortgagor may now have
'48
or subsequently execute.
Upon receiving the closing papers, Mrs. Landstrom consulted an attorney in California who advised her that the clause

740 (1946).
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 245 comment b (1981).

281 S.C. 260, 315 S.E.2d 130 (Ct. App. 1984).
Id. at 264, 315 S.E.2d at 132-33.
Id. at 263, 315 S.E.2d at 132.
Id.
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on the mortgage meant that "the mortgage might be subordinated to a future mortgage placed on the property. ' 49 In an effort to invalidate the conveyance, Mrs. Landstrom refused to
have the power of attorney probated.50 Chester Street Associates
filed suit to confirm their title to the property. Mrs. Landstrom
appealed from the circuit court's confirmation of title in Chester
52
Street Associates. 1 The court of appeals affirmed.
In affirming the lower court's decision, the court of appeals
extended the doctrine of merger in real estate transactions involving a contract to sell so that the doctrine applies not only to
deeds containing terms different from the contract, but also to
mortgages containing terms different from the contract.5 3 The
court cited Charleston & Western Carolina Railway Co. v.
Joyce5 4 as authority in reaching this conclusion. Because Joyce,
however, was limited to deeds, the court, citing out-of-state authority,55 held that "[tihe same rule applies to mortgages." 56
Thus, the practitioner should be aware that the doctrine of
merger will be applied both to the terms of a deed and to the
terms of a mortgage. As a result, mortgagees, as well as holders
of deeds, will share the same security in knowing that the terms
contained in the final instrument are controlling. This holding
broadens meaningful postcontract negotiations since both parties can be sure that the terms will be given binding effect when

49. Id.
50. Id. When the power of attorney was given, it was witnessed, but not properly
probated.

51. Id.
52. Id at 267, 315 S.E.2d at 134.
53. Id. at 264, 315 S.E.2d at 133. No other South Carolina case directly states that
,the doctrine of merger applies to a mortgage.
54. 231 S.C. 493, 99 S.E.2d 187 (1957). The supreme court held that the language of

a deed controlled the language in an option to purchase, stating the general rule that
"'[a] deed executed subsequent to the making of an executory contract for the sale of

land supersedes that contract. .. .' "Id. at 505, 99 S.E.2d at 193 (quoting 55 Am.Jun.
Vendor and Purchaser§ 327 (1946)).

55. Jordan v. Flynt, 240 Ga. 359, 240 S.E.2d 858 (1977); Timms v. Shannon, 19 Md.
296 (1962); Norment v. Turley, 24 N.M. 526, 174 P. 999 (1918).

56. 281 S.C. at 264, 315 S.E.2d at 133.
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incorporated in the body of the mortgage.
William Thomas Causby
IV.

No ELECTION REQUIRED BETWEEN QUANTUM MERUIT AND
BREACH OF EXPRESS CONTRACT

In Robert Harmon and Bore, Inc. v. Jenkins57 the South
Carolina Court of Appeals held that a party can plead both
quantum meruit and breach of contract in a single action without electing a remedy.58
This action arose when the defendant, Leroy Jenkins, failed
to comply with the terms of an alleged oral contract to lease
property to the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought suit, pleading two
causes of action: recovery under quantum meruit for the reasonable value of services he performed in preparing the property;
and damages for the defendant's breach of the alleged oral contract to lease the property. The defendant's answer denied liability and asserted the statute of frauds as a defense to the express contract cause of action. After the trial judge required the
plaintiff to elect between the causes of action for quantum meruit and breach of express contract, the plaintiff elected to pursue the express contract claim. The trial court held that defendant's answer constituted a memorandum sufficient to satisfy
the statute of frauds, and a jury awarded the plaintiff $25,000 in
damages.159
The court of appeals determined that the defendant's answer did not remove the contract from the statute of frauds, 0
but also held that the plaintiff should not have been forced to
elect between the two causes of action. 1 The court reasoned

57. 282 S.C. 189, 318 S.E.2d 371 (Ct. App. 1984).
58. The court also held that a parol contract to lease property was not removed
from the statute of frauds by the defendant's acknowledgement of certain terms of the
agreement. Id. at 194-95, 318 S.E.2d at 374. The defendant's answer admitted the existence of previous discussions "relative to the possibility of [the] premises being leased to
. . . Harmon" and provided specifics of the "proposed lease," but specified that "the
terms of the contemplated lease were never fully agreed upon" and that the lease was "to
be reduced to a formal written agreement." The lease was not reduced to writing and the
plaintiff never took possession of the premises. Id. at 192, 318 S.E.2d at 373.
59. Id. at 193, 318 S.E.2d at 373. The defendant's motions for nonsuit, directed verdict, and judgment notwithstanding the verdict were denied.
60. See supra note 58.
61. 282 S.C. at 198, 318 S.E.2d at 376.
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that the plaintiff's two causes of action, one "in the nature of
assumpsit upon a quantum meruit for the reasonable value of
services and the second for breach of contract to lease a building," 62 were not inconsistent, but were merely "two different
causes of action and a right to but a single recovery. ' 63 The
court explained that "[t]he two actions are included because of
an obvious uncertainty, in view of the statute of frauds, as to
which cause of action Harmon would be able to prove or recover
64
on."
The court was clearly correct in its determination that
pleading both quantum meruit and express contract in this case
was not inconsistent. The quantum meruit claim was for the
reasonablevalue of plaintiff's work in preparation to lease the
property. The contract action was for damages in the amount
that was to be the fruit of that work. Thus, a natural relationship existed between the action in quantum meruit and express
contract.6 5 As the court of appeals observed, "An election of
remedies involves a choice between different remedies afforded
by law for the same injury. . . . The principle has no application where two separate causes of action, each based on different
facts, exist." 6 No factual inconsistency existed between the two

62. Id. at 197, 318 S.E.2d at 376.
63. Id. at 198, 318 S.E.2d at 376.

64. Id. The court of appeals cited Tzouvelekas v. Tzouvelekas, 206 S.C. 90, 33
S.E.2d 73 (1945), which concerned the disposition of a tract of land. Legal title to the
property was vested in the defendant, the plaintiff's wife. Plaintiff's first cause of action
sought to have the property impressed with a trust in favor of him and his children. His
second cause of action sought to foreclose the mortgage he held on the property. The

wife contended that the plaintiff had to elect a remedy because the two causes of action
were inconsistent. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the principle of election

of remedies was inapplicable: "The plaintiff states two separate and distinct causes of
action, each based upon a different set of facts-one, that the property be impressed
with a trust; the other for foreclosure." Id. at 94, 33 S.E.2d at 74. The court explained
that "[p]roof in support of the trust set up in the first cause of action would not be
contradictory or destructive of proof establishing the mortgage." Id. at 95, 33 S.E.2d at

74.
65. Cf. Walker v. McDonald, 136 S.C. 231, 134 S.E.222 (1926). In Walker the plain-

tiff asserted two causes of action. The first sought to recover the sum plaintiff had paid
defendant for a one-half interest in a partnership. This claim was based on his assertion

that the defendant used fraud and deceit to induce the investment. The second cause of
action was for the balance due to the plaintiff as his share of net profits of the business.

The supreme court held that the plaintiff must elect. The first cause of action tended to
deny the existence of the partnership, while the second cause of action affirmed its existence. Thus, the causes of action were inconsistent.

66. 282 S.C. at 197, 318 S.E.2d at 376.
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causes of action.
This case instructs the practitioner that when there is uncertainty whether the statute of frauds will preclude a recovery
based on breach of contract, the plaintiff will be allowed to request recovery based both on quantum meruit and on the contract without being forced to make an election. Thus, the practitioner avoids the awkward and uncertain position of deciding
which course to pursue before knowing the court's decision on
the statute of frauds issue.
William Thomas Causby
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